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Youth in developing countries find themselves in the midst of rapid social and economic 
change.  As documented in the recent National Academy of Sciences report on transitions to 
adulthood in developing countries (Lloyd, 2005), young people face both new challenges and 
new opportunities created by cultural and economic globalization.  In order to fully understand 
the situation of young people in developing countries today it is important to understand the rapid 
demographic changes that produced the historically unprecedented numbers of young people in 
the world today.  These demographic changes potentially have important implications on the 
labor market opportunities, access to public resources, and access to family resources for youth.      
2. Data and Definitions 
This paper uses the population estimates and projections provided by the United Nations 
Population Division in World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database.  
Most of the analysis is based on the “medium variant” in the United Nations projections.  A 
detailed description of the assumptions used for these projections is provided in Appendix A.  In 
keeping with the definition adopted for the World Development Report 2007, the youth 
population is defined as the population aged 12-24.  In some cases, such as the comparison of 
projections with and without HIV/AIDS, estimates are only available in five-year age groups.  In 
these cases the population aged 10-24 is used to represent the youth population.  The countries 
included in the analysis here include all of the countries classified as low-income to middle-
income by the World Bank, plus a selected group of Eastern European countries.  In some cases 
high-income countries are included for comparative purposes.     3
3. The Peak in Youth Population 
According to the population projections of the United Nations Population Division, the 
number of young people in the world is close to reaching its historical peak, a peak that will 
arguably be the largest number of young people the world will ever see.  Figure 1 shows the 
number of 12-24 year-olds in the world and in three major developing regions – Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America – according to the U.N. medium variant projections.  The population numbers 
have been normalized to an index where 1950=100 for all regions in order to simplify 
comparisons across regions.  Although projections as far out as 2050 must be viewed with 
caution, projections over the next two decades are relatively straightforward.  The projections to 
2050 are shown because they give a picture of at least one reasonable scenario for the trends that 
will be experienced in the coming decades.  As suggested by Figure 1, there is little question that 
current youth cohorts are the largest that the world has ever seen, and that a period of rapid 
growth in the size of these cohorts is coming to an end.  While the world population aged 12-24 
more than doubled in the 35 years between 1950 and 1985, a historically unprecedented rate of 
growth, the world’s youth population is projected to decline in the 35 years after 2010.    
As shown in Figure 1, the pattern for the world as a whole reflects wide diversity across 
regions.  With Asia accounting for almost two-thirds of the world population, the pattern for Asia 
is very similar to the pattern for the world as a whole.  The rapid approach of the peak in the 
youth population is more clearly evident in Asia, however, with a projected peak around 2010.  
Latin America and the Caribbean are also approaching a peak, with a broad leveling off that 
begins around 2010.  Figure 1 shows that the pattern for Africa is substantially different, 
however.  The youth population in Africa, which is already more than four times its 1950 level, is   4
projected to continue growing until beyond 2050, with the 2050 level being eight times the level 
of 1950.   
Classifying demographic patterns 
These trends in the size of the youth population are driven by complex changes in fertility, 
mortality, and population momentum that will be discussed in detail below.  Because these 
underlying demographic trends have followed similar patterns in many countries, it is possible to 
characterize four major patterns describing trends in the size of the youth population.  The 
criterion used to classify countries is the timing of the peak in the youth population.  As 
illustrated by the example of Latin America in Figure 1, this peak is often not a sharp peak, but 
may be more characterized by a slow leveling off.  For this reason the classification is based on 
both the year in which the population aged 12-24 reaches a peak and the rates of growth of the 
youth population around specific years.  The definitions of the four specific categories are given 
in Table 1.  
Table 1. Definition of categories of the timing of the peak in the size of  
the population aged 12-24 
Category Definition 
1  Countries with peak in youth population before 2000  
Definition: countries in which the maximum youth population over the period 1950-
2050 occurred prior to 2000   
2  Countries with peak between 2000 and 2010. 
Definition: countries in which the peak youth population occurs between 2000 and 
2010 OR the peak population occurs after 2010 but the growth rate between 2005 
and 2015 is below 0.5% per year   
3  Countries with peak between 2010 and 2030 
Definition: countries in which the peak youth population occurs between 2010 and 
2030 and the growth rate between 2005 and 2015 is above 0.5% per year  
OR the peak youth population occurs after 2030 but the growth rate between 2025 
and 2035 is below 0.5% per year 
4  Countries with peak after 2030 
Definition: countries with peak after 2030 and with growth rates above 0.5% per year 
between 2025 and 2035.   
   5
Table 2 shows the distribution of the 154 countries included in our analysis into these four 
classifications.  While the largest number of countries fall in Group 4, it is important to keep in 
mind that this does not necessarily represent a larger population than the other groups.  Countries 
with large populations in Group 2 include Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and Vietnam, the third, 
fourth, eighth and ninth largest developing countries, respectively, in 2005.  Group 3 includes 
India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, the second, sixth, and tenth largest developing countries.  
Group 4 includes Pakistan and Nigeria, the fifth and seventh largest developing countries.  With 
China in Group 1, the population of developing countries is spread quite broadly across the four 
classifications.   
Table 2.  Classification of countries by timing of peak in the population aged 12-24 
Category Frequency Percent 
1. Peak before 2000  31  20.1 
2. Peak between 2000 and 2010  37  24.0 
3. Peak between 2010 and 2030  31  20.1 
4. Peak after 2030  55  35.7 
Total 154  100 
 
Appendix B provides a complete classification of 154 countries.  Appendix C presents 
figures showing the population aged 12-24 between 1950 and 2030 for each of these countries.  
As would be expected from Figure 1, Asian and Latin American countries are mostly found in 
Groups 1 and 2, while African countries dominate Groups 3 and 4.     
Figures 2-5 show selected countries in each of the four groups.  Figure 2 shows the two 
major developing countries in Group 1, China and Thailand, countries, which had already 
reached a peak in the size of the youth population before 2000.  Both countries had rapid fertility 
declines in the 1970s and 1980s, with Total Fertility Rates that were close to the replacement   6
fertility level of 2.1 by the 1990s.  The peak of the youth population was about 2.8 times its 1950 
level in Thailand, about 2.4 times its 1950 level in China.   
Figure 3 shows a group of countries in the second group, with a peak in the youth population 
occurring roughly between 2000 and 2010 – Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, and Vietnam.  
The magnitude of the peak, measured relative to the 1950 youth population, varies considerably.  
Indonesia’s youth population will peak at around 2.5 times its 1950 level, Costa Rica’s youth 
population will reach over 5 times its 1950 level, with the other countries in between.  Note that 
the peak is not very pronounced in any of these countries, with more of a long leveling off than a 
sharp peak.  Most of these countries are projected to have relatively constant youth populations 
for several decades.   
Figure 4 shows a group of countries that will reach a peak in their youth populations between 
2010 and 2030 – India, Egypt, Malaysia, Peru and the Philippines.  These are countries that have 
had later fertility declines than the group of countries shown in Figures 2 and 3.  As in Figure 2, 
most of these countries are projected to experience 20 or 30 years of relatively constant youth 
populations after they reach their peak.   
Figure 5 shows a group of countries that still have rising youth populations in 2030 – the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, and Senegal.  As the figure demonstrates, 
there is considerable heterogeneity within this group.  Some countries with very late fertility 
declines, such as Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo, are projected to have continued 
rapid growth of the youth population for the next several decades.  Other countries, such as 
Pakistan and Senegal, are projected to have slower growth, leveling off shortly after 2030.     7
The Impact of HIV/AIDS 
For some countries, especially countries in southern Africa, assumptions about AIDS 
mortality can have a significant impact on the projected size of the youth population.  The 
population projections of the U.N. Population Division include projections about AIDS mortality 
and about the potential impact of anti-retroviral treatment.  The population projections 
incorporate the UNAIDS model that is used to project the course of the epidemic in the 60 
countries with high HIV prevalence (UNAIDS Reference Group on Estimates, Modelling and 
Projections, 2002).  The complete set of projections also includes an alternative projection in 
which it is assumed that there is no AIDS mortality.  These alternative “No HIV/AIDS” 
projections are made for the 60 countries with high HIV prevalence, with projections made from 
1980 to 2050.  Figure 6 shows the medium variant projection, which includes AIDS mortality, 
and the alternative “No AIDS” projection for three countries with high HIV prevalence – 
Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia.  These projections use the 10-24 age group, rather than the 
12-24 age group, since single year of age estimates are not available for the “no AIDS” 
projections.   
Figure 6 demonstrates that AIDS mortality has a substantial impact on the size of the youth 
population in these southern African countries.  There is little difference in the two projections in 
2000, but by 2010 the projections begin to diverge.  In Botswana, for example, the youth 
population is projected to peak around 2005 by the medium variant projection, but under the 
alternative “No AIDS” projection it would have continued increasing for several more decades.   
The medium variant youth population in 2015 in Zambia is projected to be about 15% lower than 
it would have been in the absence of HIV/AIDS.     8
4. Why current youth cohorts are so large 
It is useful to consider the demographic explanations for the large size of current youth 
cohorts, and the explanations of why many countries are close to their peak youth population.  
The explanations for these trends are important for a number of reasons.  In addition to helping 
understand the sources of the current “youth bulge,” an understanding of the underlying 
processes helps put this bulge in perspective.  It also helps us understand some important features 
of today’s youth cohorts, such as the paradoxical fact that they were born into much smaller 
families than those of their parents.   
Key Features of the Demographic Transition 
Demographers use the term “demographic transition” to refer to the pattern of changes in 
fertility, mortality, and population growth that have been observed with a high degree of 
regularity around the world.  The stylized description of the demographic transition starts with a 
regime in which both death rates and birth rates are relatively high and roughly equal, implying 
low rates of population growth.  The demographic transition begins with a decline in death rates, 
potentially driven by a variety of factors.  With death rates falling, birth rates typically remain 
high for some period of time, generating population growth.  Eventually birth rates also fall, 
slowing the rate of population growth.  The transition ends when birth rates and death rates have 
both stabilized at a new low level, implying a return to low (or zero) population growth.  The 
pace at which mortality and fertility decline and the length of time between mortality decline and 
fertility decline determine the rate of population growth that will be observed during the 
demographic transition.   
High-income countries, which went through the demographic transition in the 1800s or early 
1900s, typically experienced long and relatively slow mortality decline.  The gap between birth   9
rates and death rates was never very large, and population growth rates rarely exceed 1% per 
year.  The demographic transition that took place in developing countries was quantitatively quite 
different.  Death rates declined very fast, generating population growth rates that exceeded 4% 
per year in some countries (implying doubling times of less than 20 years).     
It is instructive to look at the history of the demographic transition for a specific country.  
This section will look at the case of Brazil, a country whose mortality decline and fertility decline 
were fairly typical of countries that have now progressed quite far through the demographic 
transition.  Brazil has exceptionally good data with which to track demographic changes at both 
the macro and micro level, including detailed census data back to 1960.  Figure 7 shows the brod 
overview of the demographic transition in Brazil, based on the United Nations estimates of birth 
rates, death rates and population growth rates from 1950-55 to 2000-05.
1  The figure shows that 
the demographic transition was already well underway in Brazil by 1950, with the crude death 
rate having fallen to 15 per 1000, while the crude birth rate was almost 45 per 1000.  The rate of 
population growth was about 28 per 1000, or 2.8% per year, in the 1950s, a rate much higher 
than was ever experienced by currently high income countries when they went through the 
demographic transition.  Although the crude birth rate was falling in the 1950s, death rates were 
falling faster, causing a peak population growth rate of 3.0% in the 1960-65 period.  This was 
also the period in which world population growth rates reached their historic peak, at around 2% 
per year (Lam, 2005).   
                                                 
1 The crude birth rate is defined as the number of births per year divided by the total mid-year population, 
expressed as a ratio of births per 1000 population.  The crude death rate is deaths per year per 1000 
population.  The rate of natural increase is simply the difference between the crude birth rate and the crude 
death rate.  The rates shown are estimates of the average annual rates in each five-year period.     10
It is important to look back at the rapid population growth of the 1960s, because this is in 
many ways the origin of today’s large youth cohorts.  If we consider the children born in 
developing countries in the 1960s to be the children of the population explosion, today’s youth 
cohorts are the grandchildren of the population explosion, the children of those earlier large 
cohorts.  It is important to keep in mind this fundamental aspect of today’s youth cohorts.   
While the crude birth rates and crude death rates in Figure 7 are the ultimate determinants of 
the population growth rate, they are not the best indicators of fertility behavior of basic mortality 
conditions.  Because they are simply ratios of the numbers of births and deaths to the total 
population, they can be very sensitive to the age structure of the population.  Figure 8 shows the 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Infant Mortality Rate in Brazil over the 1950-2005 period.  The 
TFR is the sum of age-specific fertility rates in a given year, and can be interpreted as the number 
of births a woman would have in her lifetime, given the age-specific probabilities of birth in that 
year.  Unlike the crude birth rate, which is affected by the population age structure, the TFR is a 
useful summary of the actual fertility behavior of women in a given period.  The crude death rate 
is also highly affected by the population age structure, and is thus a very imperfect measure of 
the actual mortality situation in a given period.  The infant mortality rate, which measures the 
number of births that die before age 1 divided by the total number of births (expressed per 1000 
births), is much better than the crude death rate at showing the decline in mortality.  It was 
declines in infant mortality that played the most important role in driving declines in the overall 
death rate during the demographic transition.  As shown in Figure 8, infant mortality was falling 
rapidly in Brazil in the 1950s, but fertility did not begin to fall until the 1960s.  These patterns for 
Brazil are very typical of patterns in fertility and mortality throughout the developing world 
between 1950 and 2000.  While the timing and pace of the decline varies across regions, virtually   11
all developing countries experienced rapid mortality decline, a period of high population growth, 
and eventually fertility decline.   
The size of surviving birth cohorts during the demographic transition was influenced by a 
complex interaction of fertility, mortality, and population momentum.  Population momentum 
refers to the inertia that is inherent in population dynamics due to the fact that childbearing takes 
place two to three decades after birth.  The rapid growth of birth cohorts in the 1950s and 1960s 
produced a rapid growth of the childbearing-age population in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond.  
This growth of the childbearing-age population competed with the decline in fertility rates to 
determine the size of birth cohorts.   
A good picture of trends in cohort size is provided by looking again at the case of Brazil, 
where excellent census data back to 1960 provides an unusually detailed record.  Figure 9 shows 
the size of cohorts as they appear in the censuses from 1960 to 2000, using only the age groups 
below the age of 20 in each census.  These are not the size of the birth cohorts at the time they 
were born, but rather are the size of the birth cohort as it had survived to the census.  It is thus a 
fairly good measure of the size of surviving birth cohorts, a useful measure if we are interested in 
the size of youth cohorts.  The figure shows that birth cohorts grew rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s, leveled off in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then grew rapidly again in the late 1970s, 
reaching a peak in 1982.  These trends in cohort size provide a convenient summary of the 
population dynamics of the demographic transition.  The rapid growth in the size of surviving 
birth cohorts during the 1950s and early 1960s reflected the rapid decline of infant and child 
mortality.  The leveling off in the late 1960s reflected the rapid decline in fertility rates that 
began in the 1960s in Brazil.  The rapid growth in the size of cohorts born in the late 1970s was 
due to population momentum, resulting from the increase in the size of the childbearing   12
population as the birth cohorts of the 1950s reached childbearing age.  The largest birth cohort in 
Brazil was born in 1982, the point at which falling fertility finally overtook population 
momentum.  The experience for other countries will have been similar to that for Brazil, with 
differences only in the specific timing of the largest cohort.      
5. Trends in Growth Rates and Relative Cohort Size 
While there are many reasons to take note of the unprecedented size of current youth 
cohorts, for many economic issues it may be the growth rate of the youth population, or its size 
relative to other age groups, that is the critical variable.  As suggested in Figures 1-5, the growth 
rates of youth populations in most countries are lower today than they were in previous decades.  
Indeed, it is virtually a mathematical necessity that the growth rates must be declining if the total 
size of the youth population is near its peak, given the smoothness inherent in most population 
dynamics.  Figure 10 shows the annual growth rate of the youth population in the same set of 
countries shown in Figures 2-5 above (note that the vertical scales differ across panels).  The 
growth rate shown is the average annual rate of growth between two of the five-year population 
totals shown in Figures 2-5 (for example, the first point in each graph is placed at 1952.5, and 
represents the average annual growth rate between 1950 and 1955).  Looking across all four 
panels of Figure 10, several important features can be seen.  Most importantly, the peak in the 
growth rate of the youth population occurs around the 1965-70 period in almost all of the 
countries, especially for countries in the first three classifications.   
It is interesting to compare, for example, Thailand in Panel A and the Philippines in Panel C.  
Thailand, which experienced its largest youth population around 1990, had its highest rate of 
growth of the youth population in 1965-70, a growth rate of about 4%.  The youth population in 
the Philippines is projected to continue growing until around 2020, with a growth rate in the   13
2000-2010 period of about 1.5% per year.  But the peak growth rate of the youth population in 
the Philippines also occurred in the 1965-70 period, with a growth rate of 3.7%.  It is noteworthy 
how many countries shown in Figure 10 had relatively similar experiences, reaching a peak 
growth rate of the youth population around 1970 of about 3-4% per year.  The major differences 
across countries in the first three panels of Figure 10 are less in the timing and magnitude of the 
peak growth rate than in the speed at which the growth rate declined in the 1980s and 1990s.  
This reflects the fact that most developing countries experienced similar levels of rapid 
population growth in the 1960s.  The subsequent rate of decline in fertility rates differed 
substantially across countries, however, and it these differences that drive the differences in the 
rate of decline in the growth rate of the youth population during the 1980s and 1990s.   
For some economic and social questions it may be the percentage of the population in youth 
age groups that is most important.  Figure 11 shows the percentage of the total population that is 
aged 12-24, continuing to use the same countries and population projections used thus far.  An 
important lesson of Figure 11 is that most countries have already experienced the peak in the 
percentage of the population that is aged 12-24.  This peak occurs at around 25-30% of the 
population in most countries.   
While the youth population as a percentage of the total population may be important for 
some purposes, a more important indicator may be the size of the youth population relative to the 
working age population.  As will be discussed below, two important strands of literature in 
economic demography have focused on relative cohort size – the literature on the impact of 
cohort size on the youth labor market, and the literature on the “window of opportunity” resulting 
from a favorable ratio of the working age population to the dependent population.  Figure 12 
shows the ratio of the population aged 12-24 to the population aged 25-59.  Once again we see   14
that the period of the most dramatic relative numbers of youth were experienced several decades 
ago in most countries.  Most countries in the first three panels of Figure 12 experienced the 
largest peak of the youth population relative to the working age population in the 1970s or 1980s.  
As was the case with the growth rate of the youth population, in many cases we see similar 
patterns in the timing and magnitude of the peak in the relative size of youth cohorts for countries 
that look quite different in terms of the timing of the peak in the total size of the youth 
population.  Thailand and the Philippines both reached a peak around 1975, when there were 
about 0.9 12-24 year-olds for every 25-59 year-old.  The difference in the countries is that this 
ratio had fallen to about 0.5 in Thailand in 2005, while in the Philippines it was still over 0.7.   
Even in the countries in Panel D, where the youth population will continue to grow for the 
next several decades, the ratio of the youth population to the working-age population has in most 
cases already begun to decline.  To the extent that this ratio is a critical measure of the pressure 
the youth population places on resources or labor markets, it is important to recognize that the 
pressure has already begun to diminish in most countries.   
6. Family Size versus Cohort Size 
One of the important, if somewhat paradoxical, features of population dynamics during the 
demographic transition is that the size of birth cohorts can move in the opposite direction from 
the size of families.  This is another consequence of population momentum, which can cause a 
gap in the timing between the decline in fertility and the decline in the size of birth cohorts.  Lam 
and Marteleto (2005) analyze the case of Brazil, using the detailed census and survey data back 
to 1960.  As can be seen by comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9 above, there is roughly a fifteen 
year delay in Brazil between the onset of fertility decline, which occurs in the late 1960s, and the 
birth of the largest birth cohort in 1982.  This means that there is a period in which family size is   15
on the decrease while cohort size is on the increase, potentially creating offsetting effects in 
terms of resources available to children and youth.   
Using the micro data from the Brazilian censuses of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000, Lam 
and Marteleto analyze the number of siblings born to different cohorts of young people.  These 
estimates are made by matching young people to their mothers in the census and using the 
mothers’ reports of children ever born and children surviving.  Figure 13 shows the average 
number of siblings ever born and siblings still surviving at the time of the census for youth aged 
12-14 in each of these Brazilian censuses.  Note that the surviving number of siblings increases 
slightly between 1960 and 1970, even though the number of siblings ever born declines.  This 
represents the effect of rapidly falling infant and child mortality, which more than offset the 
decline in fertility that had already begun to appear.  Between the 1970 and 1980 censuses the 
impact of falling fertility more than offset the impact of declines in infant and child mortality, 
with young people in 1980 having fewer surviving siblings than their counterparts in 1970.  The 
number of surviving siblings fell by almost one child between the 1980 and 1991 censuses and 
again between the 1991 and 2000 censuses.  The cumulative decline between 1960 and 2000 was 
2.3 siblings, a 44% decline.  As shown by Lam and Marteleto, this decline was driven in 
particular by a decline in the prevalence of large families.  The result was a significant decline in 
the competition for resources within families, potentially an important factor affecting their 
health and schooling.  At the same time, most of these young people were being born at a time 
when cohort size was rapidly increasing, implying increased competition for resources at the 
macro level.  The pattern observed in Brazil is similar to that in most developing countries.  
Many of today’s young people grew up in a period in which cohort size was increasing but 
family size was decreasing, implying that they have had to compete with rising numbers of   16
children from other families in getting access to school or health care, at the same time that they 
have had to compete with fewer siblings in their own families.   
7. Comparisons to Youth Demography in High-income Countries 
Before discussing the economic implications of trends in youth demography in low-income 
and middle-income countries, it is interesting to compare these trends to those observed in recent 
decades in high-income countries.  A large literature focused on the impact on the labor market 
of the baby boom cohort in the United States and a related “youth bulge” in Europe.  How did the 
changes in the relative size of the youth population in the United Sates and Europe compare to 
the changes that have been taking place in developing regions?    
Figure 14 shows the growth rate of the youth population and the ratio of the youth 
population to the working-age population for the France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and 
United States, countries in which there has considerable focus on the implications of youth cohort 
size in recent decades.  Looking at the annual growth rates in Panel A, it is interesting to note that 
growth rates approaching 4% per year were seen in several countries.  These are similar to the 
peak growth rates of the youth population observed in most developing countries, as shown in 
Figure 10.  The cause of these spikes in the youth population was very different in the high-
income countries than it was in the developing countries.  The fluctuations in age structure in the 
high-income countries were driven by sudden increases in the birth rate in the 1950s.  These baby 
booms were followed by equally rapid declines in birth rates, generating large swings in the size 
of cohorts born over these decades.  
Looking at the ratio of the youth population to the working-age population in Panel B, these 
levels also exhibit a range of variation over short periods of time that is similar to the range 
experienced in developing countries.  The absolute level of this ratio remains at levels well below   17
those observed in developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s, however.  In the United 
States the ratio of the youth population to the working-age population fell by 38% between the 
1975 and 2000, from 0.6 to 0.37.  Thailand and Brazil also had a peak in this ratio in 1975, with 
declines between 1975 and 2000 of 44% in Thailand and 27% in Brazil.  An important difference 
is that Thailand and Brazil, like most of the other countries shown in Figure 12, had continued 
declines in the relative size of the youth population after 2000, while the United States and 
Europe have had a relatively constant ratio of the youth population to the working-age 
population.    
8. Economic Implications of Youth Demography 
The demographic patterns documented above have potentially important economic 
implications.  The following sections discuss specific areas in which youth demography may 
make a significant economic impact, with particular focus on labor markets, savings, and public 
expenditures.   
Youth Labor Markets 
One of the most obvious areas in which to consider the economic implications of changes in 
the absolute and relative numbers of young people is in the youth labor market.  Economic theory 
predicts that the absolute size, relative size, and rate of growth of the youth population could all 
potentially have an impact on the wages and employment opportunities of young people.  Which 
of these variables will have the largest impact will depend on the nature of the labor market, the 
degree of complementarity or substitutability of youth labor with other factors of production, and 
the speed of adjustment of other factors in response to changes in the supply of youth in the labor 
market.  The absolute size of the youth population will be important in relationship to the total 
quantity of other factors of production.  Some of these factors, such as land, may in fact be   18
relatively fixed in supply, though in practice the supply of land has been a relatively unimportant 
component in explaining economic growth, wage levels, or levels of poverty even during the last 
fifty years of rapid population growth (Johnson, 2000, Lam, 2005).   
Physical capital is the most important non-labor factor or production.  While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss the determinants of capital accumulation, there is little reason to 
think that the capital stock is independent of the absolute size or rate of growth of the labor force.  
This implies that the absolute size of the youth population is unlikely to have any particular 
economic significance in and of itself, especially in terms of the labor market.  A high rate of 
growth of the youth population, however, may be of more economic interest, since it may push 
against the rate of growth of physical capital, potentially leading to lower wages or at least lower 
wage growth.  This will be discussed below in regard to the impact of cohort size on savings.  To 
the extent that it is the growth rate of the youth labor market that has important economic 
implications, it is important to recall from Figure 10 that the rate of growth of the youth 
population has been declining in most developing countries for several decades.  While a number 
of countries, especially in Africa and south Asia, continue to have growth rates of their youth 
population of around 2% per year, a rate that can add significantly to the employment challenges 
facing these countries, these growth rates are comfortably below the 3% or 4% growth rates that 
were experienced by most developing countries in the 1970s, and the growth rates are steadily 
declining.   
In addition to land and physical capital, youth labor gets combined with the labor of more 
experienced workers.  The relationship between youth workers and older workers may be one of 
the most important economic aspects of youth cohort size, and has been the focus of attention in 
several strands of literature.  As mentioned above, there is a large literature in labor economics   19
and economic demography analyzing the impact of cohort size on the labor market in the United 
States and Europe.  Research on the United States, such as Freeman (1979), Welch (1979), and 
Berger (1985, 1989), looked at the initial earnings and subsequent earning growth of the large 
baby boom cohort that entered the labor market in the 1970s.  Many European countries also 
experienced declining fertility in the 1960s that resulted in declines in the size of youth cohorts 
entering the labor market in the 1980s.  Korenman and Neumark (2000) provide a useful review 
of the research that analyzing the impact of cohort size on labor markets in Europe.   
A broad consensus from the research on the labor market impact of relative cohort size in the 
United States and Europe is that there does appear to be a negative impact of relative youth 
cohort size on the wages and employment opportunities of young people.  Most of these studies 
use some measure of the relative number of young workers to older workers, similar to the 
relative cohort size used in Figure 12.  Most studies that examine the longer term experience of 
cohorts find that the negative impact of being in a large youth cohort tends to diminish over time.  
In some studies, the disadvantage of being in a large cohort almost completely disappears as the 
cohort ages.  Other studies find more persistent effects.  Using cross-national data from OECD 
countries from 1970 to 1994, Korenman and Neumark estimate an elasticity of youth 
unemployment to relative cohort size of around 0.5.  They conclude that the impact of relative 
cohort size is easily swamped by other macroeconomic and labor market conditions, and argue 
that cohort size per se is unlikely to have a major impact on unemployment rates in OECD 
countries.   
While it is potentially misleading to apply the results of this research on OECD countries to 
developing countries, several points are worth noting.  First, as shown in the figures above, the 
fluctuations in relative cohort size in OECD countries are roughly similar in magnitude to the   20
changes experienced by developing countries.  It is therefore perhaps reasonable to draw 
inferences based on the OECD experience, with the literature suggesting that larger relative 
cohort size will have a negative but relatively modest impact on youth employment prospects.  A 
second point is that the relative size of youth cohorts, the measure that is the focus of study in 
most of this research, peaked in the 1970s and 1980s in many developing countries, and is 
beginning to decline even in the countries with the latest fertility decline.  Combining the 
empirical evidence on the impact of cohort size with the demographic patterns, there would seem 
to be little reason to expect that developing countries will be experiencing a youth labor market 
crisis in the coming decades, at least as far as demographic pressure alone is concerned.  On the 
contrary, the period of most rapid pressure on youth wages and employment has already been 
passed in most countries.   
Relative Cohort Size, Savings, and Public Expenditures  
Another important area in which there has been attention to the economic implications of 
relative cohort size is the literature on dependency burden and savings rates.  This literature has a 
long history, going back to the work of Coale and Hoover (1958) and Leff (1969), who argued 
that countries with high population growth rates suffered from low savings rates due to the high 
ratio of children and youth to the working-age population.  These arguments have taken on a 
somewhat different form in a body of work that focuses on the rapid changes in dependency 
burdens that take place during the demographic transition.  Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue 
that a rapid rise in the ratio of the working population to the non-working population in East Asia 
between 1965 and 1990 played an important role in driving the East Asian “economic miracle.”  
Bloom and Williamson argue that part of the effect of having faster growth in the working-age 
population is due simply to the faster growth of the labor force, increasing per capita output due   21
to a concentration of the population in productive ages.  In addition to this, however, they argue 
that there is an effect that works through savings and capital accumulation.  This effect, which 
recalls the arguments of Coale and Hoover, involves a negative impact of the dependency rate on 
savings.  The impact of dependency rates on aggregate savings derives in part from life cycle 
savings patterns, with older adults saving more than young adults.   
The idea that countries experience a “demographic dividend” or “demographic bonus” when 
the working age population begins to grow faster than the pre-working-age population has been 
pursued in papers such as Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000) and Bloom and Canning (2001).  
While work such as Deaton and Paxson (1997) find limited support in micro-level data for the 
hypothesized link between age structure, savings, and economic growth, the idea of a 
demographic bonus has intuitive appeal in a number of dimensions.  Some of these effects may 
be particularly relevant for youth.  As pointed out by Lee (1994), public expenditures, especially 
when they are funded by taxes on income or consumption (as opposed to, say, mineral wealth) 
will be affected by the ratio of the taxpaying population to the beneficiary population.  Youth will 
typically be net beneficiaries rather than net taxpayers, depending on the state to finance primary 
and secondary schooling, post-secondary education, training programs, and health programs.  
The relevant demographic variable will be the ratio of the youth population to the working-age 
population, although the growth rate of the youth population may also play a role to the extent 
that public expenditures are slow to respond to changing demand (as in the case of schools, for 
example, where physical facilities and the training of teachers will create inertia, even aside from 
funding issues).   
As emphasized above, although the youth population is the largest it has ever been in most 
developing countries, the size of the youth population relative to the working-age population is   22
lower in most countries than it was 20 years ago.  The declines in this ratio have been 
considerable, with declines of 25% to 50% in many countries between their historic peak and the 
levels observed in 2005.  Taken literally, a 25% decline in this ratio, a decline that is quite 
common across developing countries, implies that a given dollar collected in taxes for secondary 
schooling from each working-age person could pay for a 33% increase in school pending per 
youth in 2005, compared to the year of the peak ratio.  These ratios are on the decline in almost 
every developing country, implying that from this perspective the economic circumstances for 
investing in youth are steadily improving.   
Conclusions 
This paper has documented the demography of youth in developing countries.  Using the 
medium variant projections of the United Nations Population Division, it is clear that the youth 
population – the population aged 12-24 – in most developing countries is the largest it has ever 
been.  In a number of countries the youth population is the largest it will be for many decades, 
and plausibly the largest it will ever be.  Four broad patterns describe the timing of the peak in 
the youth population.  A few countries, notably Thailand and China, already experienced the 
peak in their youth population before 2000, and are on a clear downward trajectory.  A large 
second group, including numerous Latin American countries and East Asian countries, is 
experiencing a peak between 2000 and 2010.  A third group, characterized by somewhat slower 
fertility decline than the countries in the first two groups, is projected to reach a peak youth 
population between 2010 and 2030.  A fourth group of countries, including most of Africa as 
well as some South Asian countries, is projected to continue with growth of its youth population 
until beyond 2030.  These countries tend to be the poorest countries in the world, and have been 
late to experience declines in fertility.     23
As illustrated with the specific case of Brazil, the explanation for today’s large youth cohorts 
and for the timing of the peak in youth populations is directly linked to the rapid changes in 
mortality and fertility that produced the demographic transition.  Today’s youth cohorts are 
broadly speaking the children of the large cohorts born during the population explosion that 
peaked in the 1960s.  Paradoxically, they were born during a period of rapidly falling fertility, 
with the large size of their cohorts driven by population momentum rather than high fertility.  
Because of this, today’s youth were typically born into much smaller families were their parents.  
They have thus grown up with unusually heavy competition for resources due to large cohort size 
at the macro level, while competing with smaller numbers of siblings at the micro level.   
The population dynamics of the demographic transition lead to a number of important 
features of today’s youth demography.  Although the absolute size of the cohorts is historically 
unprecedented, the growth rate of the youth population reached a peak in most developing 
countries around 1970.  Growth rates of the youth population are well below the peak growth 
rates of the 1960s and 1970s, and continue to decline in most developing countries.  This is true 
even in the group of poor countries the slowest fertility decline.  Similar patterns are observed for 
the percentage of the population aged 12-24 and for the ratio of the youth population to the 
working-age population.  The youth percentage reached a peak in many countries before 2000, 
although it will continue to rise in some of the countries that have the latest peak in the total 
youth population.  The ratio of the youth population to the working-age population peaked 
considerably sooner than the youth percentage, having peaked in most countries in the 1970s or 
1980s.  This ratio is at or near its peak even in most of the countries with the highest fertility.   
There are potentially important economic implications from these trends in youth 
demography.  The absolute size, the rate of growth, and the relative size of the youth population   24
could all have an impact on economic growth rates, wages, unemployment, and public 
expenditures.  Economic theory suggests that absolute size per se is probably the least important 
economic variable, however, since fixed factors of production are unlikely to be significant in 
these economies.  The rate of growth of the youth population and the size of the youth population 
relative to other age groups are more likely to have important economic effects.  A large 
literature on the impact of relative cohort size on labor markets in the United States and Europe 
suggests that large youth cohorts relative to the working-age population could have moderate 
negative effects on wages and employment.  Research on the impact of age structure on 
economic growth in developing countries suggests that a large youth population relative to the 
working-age population can also have negative effects on savings and economic growth.   
While this evidence suggests that large youth populations may have potentially negative 
economic effects, it is important that most developing countries have already experienced the 
peak in their youth population relative to the working-age population.  This ratio has declined 
considerably since its peak in most countries, and will continue to decline in the coming decades.  
Countries that will have continued growth of the youth population beyond 2030 have the highest 
ratios of youth population to the working-age population, and many are just beginning to see the 
ratio decline.  These countries face substantial challenges in providing youth employment and 
providing health and education services to these large youth cohorts.  The ratio of youth to the 
working-age population is projected to decline in most of these countries over the coming 
decades, however, providing some relief as they try to meet the needs of their youth populations.        25
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Figure 2.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population before 2000
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Figure 3.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2000-2010 
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Figure 4.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2010-2030 
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Figure 5.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population after 2030 
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Figure 6.  Projected Youth Population with and without AIDS
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Figure 7.  Demographic Transition in Brazil
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1960 census  36
Figure 10. Growth Rate of Population Aged 9-12, 1950-2050,  
United Nations Medium Variant Projections 
Figure 10a.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population before 2000

































Figure 10b.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2000-2010 




































Figure 10c.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2010-2030 



































Figure 10d.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population after 2030 
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Figure 11. Percentage of Population Aged 12-24, 1950-2050,  
United Nations Medium Variant Projections 
Figure 10a.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population before 2000
























Figure 10b.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2000-2010 



























Figure 10c.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2010-2030 



























Figure 10d.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population after 2030 
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Figure 12. Ratio of Population Aged 12-24 to Population Aged 25-59, 1950-2050,  
United Nations Medium Variant Projections 
Figure 11a.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population before 2000






















Figure 11b.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2000-2010 





















Figure 11c.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population in 2010-2030 

























Figure 11d.  Selected Countries with Peak in Youth Population after 2030 

























Figure 13.  Average Number of Siblings of Brazilian 
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Figure 14. Measures of Youth Demography for the France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and 
United States, 1950-2050, United Nations Medium Variant Projections 
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The demography of youth in developing countries  







Appendix A.  Assumptions used in the United Nations Population Projections  
(taken from http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=4 on October 31, 2005)  
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE RESULTS OF THE 2004 REVISION OF WORLD 
POPULATION PROSPECTS 
The future population of each country is projected from an estimated population for 1 July 2005. Because 
actual population data for 2005 are not yet available, the 2005 estimate is based upon the most recent population 
data available for each country, derived usually from a census or population register, updated to 2005 using all 
available data on fertility, mortality and international migration. In cases where very recent data are not 
available, estimated demographic trends are short term projections from the most recent available data. 
Population data from all sources are evaluated for completeness, accuracy and consistency, and adjusted where 
necessary.  
To project population until 2050, the United Nations Population Division applies assumptions regarding 
future trends in fertility, mortality, and migration. Because future trends cannot be known with certainty, a 
number of projection variants are produced. 
The 2004 Revision includes six projection variants. The results for four are available on the web. These 
four variants differ among themselves with respect to the assumptions made regarding the future course of 
fertility. 
To describe the different projection variants, the assumptions made regarding fertility, mortality and 
international migration are described first.  
A. Fertility assumptions: Convergence toward total fertility below replacement   42
Fertility assumptions are described in terms of the following groups of countries:  
High-fertility countries: Countries that until 2005 had had no fertility reduction or only an incipient decline;  
Medium-fertility countries: Countries where fertility has been declining but whose level was still above 2.1 
children per woman in 2000-2005;  
Low-fertility countries: Countries with total fertility at or below 2.1 children per woman in 2000-2005.  
Medium-fertility assumptions: 
Total fertility in all countries is assumed to converge eventually toward a level of 1.85 children per 
woman. However, not all countries reach this level during the projection period, that is, by 2050. The basic 
principle of fertility projection is the same for all countries, but projection procedures are slightly different 
depending on whether countries had a total fertility above or below 1.85 children per woman in 2000-2005. 
Fertility in high-fertility and medium-fertility countries is assumed to follow a path derived from models of 
fertility decline established by the United Nations Population Division on the basis of the past experience of all 
countries with declining fertility during 1950-2005. The models relate the level of total fertility during a period to 
the average expected decline in total fertility during the next period. If the total fertility projected by a model for a 
country falls to 1.85 children per woman before 2050, total fertility is held constant at that level for the remainder of 
the projection period (that is, until 2050). That is, 1.85 children per woman represents a floor value below which the 
total fertility of high and medium-fertility countries is not allowed to drop before 2050. However, it is not necessary 
for all countries to reach the floor value by 2050. If the model of fertility change used produces a total fertility above 
1.85 children per woman for 2045-2050, that value is used in projecting the population. In all cases, the projected 
fertility paths yielded by the models are checked against recent trends in fertility for each country. When a country’s 
recent fertility trends deviate considerably from those consistent with the models, fertility is projected over an initial 
period of 5 or 10 years in such a way that it follows recent experience. The model projection takes over after that 
transition period. For instance, in countries where fertility has stalled or where there is no evidence of fertility 
decline, fertility is projected to remain constant for several more years before a declining path sets in.   43
Fertility in low-fertility countries is generally assumed to remain below 2.1 children per woman during most of 
the projection period and reach 1.85 children per woman by 2045-2050. For countries where total fertility was below 
1.85 children per woman in 2000-2005, it is assumed that over the first 5 or 10 years of the projection period fertility 
will follow the recently observed trends in each country. After that transition period, fertility is assumed to increase 
linearly at a rate of 0.07 children per woman per quinquennium. Thus, countries whose fertility is currently very low 
need not reach a level of 1.85 children per woman by 2050.  
High-fertility assumptions: 
Under the high variant, fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children above the fertility in the medium variant 
over most of the projection period. By 2045-2050, fertility in the high variant is therefore half a child higher than 
that of the medium variant. That is, countries reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children per woman in the medium 
variant have a total fertility of 2.35 children per woman in the high variant at the end of the projection period.  
Low-fertility assumptions:  
Under the low variant, fertility is projected to remain 0.5 children below the fertility in the medium variant over 
most of the projection period. By 2045-2050, fertility in the low variant is therefore half a child lower than that of 
the medium variant. That is, countries reaching a total fertility of 1.85 children per woman in the medium variant 
have a total fertility of 1.35 children per woman in the low variant at the end of the projection period.  
Constant-fertility assumption:  
For each country, fertility remains constant at the level estimated for 2000-2005.  
B. Mortality assumptions: Increasing life expectancy except when affected by HIV/AIDS 
Normal-mortality assumption:  
Mortality is projected on the basis of models of change of life expectancy produced by the United Nations 
Population Division. These models produce smaller gains the higher the life expectancy already reached. The 
selection of a model for each country is based on recent trends in life expectancy by sex. For countries highly 
affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the model incorporating a slow pace of mortality decline has generally been 
used to project the reduction of general mortality risks not related to HIV/AIDS.    44
The impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality:  
For the 60 countries highly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, estimates of the impact of HIV/AIDS are 
made by explicitly modelling the course of the epidemic and by projecting the yearly incidence of HIV infection. 
The model developed by the UNAIDS Reference Group on Estimates, Modelling and Projections
2 is used to fit past 
estimates of HIV prevalence provided by UNAIDS so as to derive the parameters determining the past dynamics of 
the epidemic. For most countries, the model is fitted assuming that the relevant parameters have remained constant 
in the past. Beginning in 2005, the parameter PHI, which reflects the rate of recruitment of new individuals into the 
high-risk or susceptible group, is projected to decline by half every thirty years. The parameter R, which represents 
the force of infection, is projected to decline in the same manner. The reduction in R reflects the assumption that 
changes in behaviour among those subject to the risk of infection, along with increases in access to treatment for 
those infected, will reduce the chances of transmitting the virus. The rate of mother-to-child transmission is 
projected to decline at varying rates, depending on each country’s progress in increasing access to treatment. In 
addition, the component of the Reference Group model relative to the survivorship of infected children has been 
updated: in the 2004 Revision it is assumed that 50 per cent of children infected through mother-to-child 
transmission will survive to age two. 
The 2004 Revision incorporates for the first time a longer survival for persons receiving treatment with highly 
active antiretroviral therapy (ART). The proportion of the HIV-positive population receiving treatment in each 
country is consistent with estimates prepared by the World Health Organization for end of 2004
32. Coverage is 
projected to reach between 40 percent and 85 per cent by 2015, depending on the current level of coverage. It is 
assumed that, on average, annual survival probabilities increase to at least 80 for individuals receiving ART. Under 
this assumption, mean survival from the initiation of therapy is 3.1 years (median 4.5 years). In contrast, in the 
absence of treatment mean survival after progression to AIDS is assumed to be just one year.  
                                                 
2 "Improved methods and assumptions for estimation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its impact: Recommendations 
of the UNAIDS Reference Group on Estimates, Modelling and Projections". AIDS, vol. 16, pp. W1-W14 
(UNAIDS Reference Group on Estimates, Modelling and Projections, 2002). 
3 World Health Organization. “3 by 5” Progress Report, December 2004. WHO and UNAIDS.   45
C. International migration assumptions 
Normal-migration assumption:  
The future path of international migration is set on the basis of past international migration estimates and an 
assessment of the policy stance of countries with regard to future international migration flows.  
D. The projection variants 
Table 1 presents in a schematic way the different assumptions underlying the four projection variants. As 
shown, the four variants (low, medium, high and constant-fertility) share the same assumptions regarding mortality 
and international migration. They differ among themselves only with respect to the assumptions regarding fertility. 
A comparison of their results allows therefore an assessment of the effects that different fertility paths have on other 
demographic parameters. 
Table 1. Projection variants in terms of assumptions for fertility, mortality and international migration  
  Assumptions  
Projection variant   Fertility  Mortality 
International 
migration 
Low Low  Normal  Normal 
Medium Medium  Normal  Normal 
High High  Normal  Normal 
Constant-fertility Constant  Normal  Normal 
Constant-mortality Medium  Constant  Normal 
Zero-migration Medium  Normal  Zero 
 
E. Methodological changes made for the 2004 Revision 
In the medium variant, the fertility of countries with a total fertility below 1.85 children per woman in 2000-
2005 is projected first by continuing recent trends and then by increasing fertility linearly at a rate of 0.07 children 
per woman per quinquennium. These countries do not necessarily reach a level of 1.85 children per woman by 2050.   46
In the 2004 Revision, additional models of mortality change have been used to capture the diversity of 
historical experience in the rise of life expectancy. Specifically, very slow and very fast models of change have been 
developed and added to the previously existing slow, medium and fast models. 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality is modelled explicitly for all countries that had adult HIV prevalence of one 
per cent or greater in 2003. 
Treatment with antiretroviral therapy is explicitly incorporated into the projection of HIV/AIDS for affected 
countries. In addition, the rate of mother-to-child transmission of HIV is projected to decline at a rate consistent with 
projected progress in expanding access to treatment.   















1. Countries with peak before 2000       
1 152  Albania  1989  -0.5%  0.1% 
1 106  Armenia  1980  -3.0%  0.2% 
1 183  Barbados  1976  -1.6%  -0.8% 
1 127  Belarus  1977  -4.3%  -0.6% 
1  154  Bosnia and Herzegovina  1978  -1.8%  -0.7% 
1 128  Bulgaria  1970  -3.6%  -1.4% 
1 71  China  1987  -1.0%  0.3% 
1 155  Croatia  1950  -1.7%  -0.3% 
1 186  Cuba  1986  -0.9%  -1.0% 
1 129  Czech  Republic  1967  -2.6%  -0.5% 
1 140  Estonia  1988  -3.7%  0.2% 
1 111  Georgia  1977  -2.6%  -1.0% 
1 190  Guadeloupe  1989  1.1%  -1.6% 
1 221  Guyana  1981  -1.3%  -3.4% 
1 130  Hungary  1970  -1.6%  -0.8% 
1 84  Kazakhstan  1977  -2.5%  -0.2% 
1  74  Korea, Dem. Rep.  1988  0.5%  -0.2% 
1 146  Latvia  1979  -4.0%  -0.2% 
1 147  Lithuania  1983  -2.7%  0.1% 
1 193  Martinique  1980  -0.6%  -1.5% 
1 17  Mauritius  1984  0.1%  -0.5% 
1 131  Poland  1973  -3.3%  -0.3% 
1 133  Romania  1991  -3.4%  -1.1% 
1 134  Russian  Federation  1975  -4.4%  -0.5% 
1  163  Serbia and Montenegro  1998  -1.8%  -0.5% 
1 135  Slovakia  1997  -2.8%  -0.5%   48
1 164  Slovenia  1994  -2.9%  -0.7% 
1 224  Suriname  1985  -0.9%  -1.3% 
1 166  TFYR  Macedonia  1979  -1.7%  -0.2% 
1 103  Thailand  1990  -0.6%  -0.4% 
1 136  Ukraine  1976  -4.0%  -0.9% 
2. Countries with peak between 2000 and 2010      
2 38  Algeria  2005  -1.3%  0.8% 
2 213  Argentina  2030  0.3%  0.1% 
2 107  Azerbaijan  2007  -1.3%  0.7% 
2 46  Botswana  2008  -0.2%  0.0% 
2 215  Brazil  2024  -0.3%  -0.4% 
2 216  Chile  2009  -0.1%  0.0% 
2 205  Costa  Rica  2008  0.0%  -0.2% 
2 188  Dominican  Republic  2027  0.2%  -0.2% 
2 238  Fiji  2002  -0.2%  -0.8% 
2 191  Haiti  2030  0.0%  0.1% 
2 97  Indonesia  2002  -0.3%  -1.0% 
2 83  Iran  2004  -2.5%  0.9% 
2 192  Jamaica  2011  0.4%  -0.7% 
2 85  Kyrgyzstan  2008  -0.1%  -0.5% 
2 116  Lebanon  2012  0.4%  0.0% 
2 47  Lesotho  2006  -0.8%  -0.1% 
2 40  Libya  2030  -1.1%  0.1% 
2 209  Mexico  2012  0.2%  -0.7% 
2  247  Micronesia (Federated States of)  2024  -0.5%  -1.3% 
2 76  Mongolia  2006  -0.9%  -0.6% 
2 41  Morocco  2029  -0.2%  0.0% 
2 100  Myanmar  2009  -0.1%  -0.4% 
2  132  Republic of Moldova  2002  -3.6%  -0.3% 
2 198  Saint  Lucia  2006  -0.7%  -0.1% 
2  199  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  2001  -2.2%  -1.3% 
2  36  Sao Tome and Principe  2029  0.5%  0.1% 
2 49  South  Africa  2014  0.3%  -0.4% 
2 89  Sri  Lanka  2000  -1.1%  -0.4% 
Classific U.N. Country Year  of 









2 50  Swaziland  2008  -0.2%  0.5% 
2 259  Tonga  2004  -0.4%  -1.9% 
2  200  Trinidad and Tobago  2001  -3.4%  -0.2% 
2 43  Tunisia  2004  -1.5%  -0.1% 
2 122  Turkey  2020  0.4%  -0.3% 
2 91  Turkmenistan  2008  -0.2%  0.2% 
2 92  Uzbekistan  2009  0.1%  0.0% 
2 104  Viet  Nam  2007  -0.5%  -0.2% 
2 26  Zimbabwe  2008  0.0%  0.3% 
3. Countries with peak between 2010 and 2030      
3 108  Bahrain  2015  1.9%  -0.4% 
3 80  Bangladesh  2039  1.1%  0.4% 
3 204  Belize  2027  1.2%  -0.1% 
3 214  Bolivia  2027  1.8%  -0.1% 
3 29  Cameroon  2041  1.5%  0.4% 
3 217  Colombia  2016  0.9%  -0.1% 
3 218  Ecuador  2019  0.7%  -0.3% 
3 39  Egypt  2031  0.3%  0.3% 
3 206  El  Salvador  2024  1.1%  -0.1% 
3 208  Honduras  2032  1.7%  0.2% 
3 82  India  2024  0.8%  -0.2% 
3 113  Israel  2025  1.3%  -0.2% 
3 114  Jordan  2021  1.9%  0.0% 
3 99  Malaysia  2016  1.5%  -0.2% 
3 237  Melanesia  2043  2.1%  0.3% 
3 243  Micronesia  2026  1.1%  -0.1% 
3 210  Nicaragua  2030  1.1%  0.0% 
3 211  Panama  2027  1.0%  0.0% 
3  240  Papua New Guinea  2044  2.5%  0.4% 
3 223  Peru  2033  0.7%  0.2% 
3 101  Philippines  2018  1.1%  -0.2% 
3 251  Polynesia  2014  0.8%  -0.9%   50
3 119  Qatar  2050  1.7%  0.1% 
3 19  Réunion  2026  0.7%  -0.2% 
3 257  Samoa  2017  1.9%  -2.6% 
3 241  Solomon  Islands  2042  2.0%  0.2% 
3 42  Sudan  2049  1.9%  0.4% 
3  121  Syrian Arab Republic  2030  0.5%  0.2% 
3 225  Uruguay  2017  0.5%  -0.5% 
3 242  Vanuatu  2041  1.6%  0.4% 
3 226  Venezuela  2030  0.6%  0.1% 
4. Countries with peak after 2030      
4 79  Afghanistan  2050  3.7%  2.8% 
4 28  Angola  2050  2.7%  2.4% 
4 52  Benin  2050  2.6%  1.8% 
4 81  Bhutan  2050  1.4%  1.2% 
4 53  Burkina  Faso  2050  2.9%  2.4% 
4 9  Burundi  2050  1.8%  3.5% 
4 95  Cambodia  2035  0.1%  1.0% 
4 54  Cape  Verde  2037  0.8%  0.6% 
4  30  Central African Republic  2050  1.9%  0.9% 
4 31  Chad  2050  2.9%  3.0% 
4 10  Comoros  2050  2.1%  0.6% 
4 32  Congo  2050  3.3%  2.9% 
4 55  Côte  d'Ivoire  2050  1.5%  0.7% 
4  33  Dem. Rep. Congo  2050  2.9%  2.7% 
4 11  Djibouti  2050  1.8%  0.7% 
4 96  East  Timor  2050  0.9%  2.2% 
4 34  Equatorial  Guinea  2050  2.7%  2.1% 
















4 12  Eritrea  2050  2.9%  1.5% 
4 13  Ethiopia  2050  2.6%  1.5% 
4 22
0 
French Guiana  2040  2.7%  0.6% 
4 35  Gabon  2041  1.8%  0.5% 
4 56  Gambia  2050  2.6%  0.6% 
4 57  Ghana  2050  1.3%  0.6% 
4 20
7 
Guatemala 2038  2.4%  0.8% 
4 58  Guinea  2050  2.8%  1.8% 
4 59  Guinea-Bissau  2050  3.3%  2.9% 
4 11
2 
Iraq 2050  2.4%  0.9% 
4 14  Kenya  2050  1.2%  1.4% 
4 98  Laos  2042  2.0%  0.7% 
4 60  Liberia  2050  2.7%  2.7% 
4 15  Madagascar  2050  3.0%  1.3% 
4 16  Malawi  2050  3.3%  1.8% 
4 86  Maldives  2037  1.8%  0.9% 
4 61  Mali  2050  3.1%  2.5% 
4 62  Mauritania  2050  2.7%  1.4% 
4 18  Mozambique  2050  2.4%  1.1% 
4 48  Namibia  2040  2.1%  1.1% 
4 87  Nepal  2043  2.0%  0.7% 
4 63  Niger  2050  3.6%  2.9% 
4 64  Nigeria  2050  2.2%  0.9% 
4 11
8 
Oman 2038  0.8%  0.9% 
4 88  Pakistan  2039  1.3%  0.9% 




Paraguay 2049  1.6%  0.6% 
4 20  Rwanda  2050  0.9%  1.2% 
4 66  Senegal  2040  1.9%  0.7% 
4 67  Sierra  Leone  2050  2.5%  2.2% 
4 22  Somalia  2050  3.2%  1.7% 
4 90  Tajikistan  2035  1.0%  0.6% 
4 24  Tanzania  2039  1.8%  0.5% 
4 68  Togo  2048  2.5%  1.0% 
4 23  Uganda  2050  3.4%  3.7% 
4 44  Western  Sahara  2038  2.7%  2.3% 
4 12
4 
Yemen 2050  2.7%  2.0% 
4 25  Zambia  2050  1.9%  1.4% 
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Appendix C.  Size of Population Aged 12-24 from 1950 to 2050, United 









































































































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Albania Armenia Barbados
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
China Croatia Cuba
Czech Republic Estonia Georgia
Guadeloupe Guyana Hungary


































United Nations Medium Variant Projections























































































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Lithuania Martinique Mauritius
Poland Romania Russian Federation
Serbia and Montenegro Slovakia Slovenia



































United Nations Medium Variant Projections










































































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Algeria Argentina Azerbaijan
Botswana Brazil Chile





































United Nations Medium Variant Projections














































































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Micronesia (Federated States of) Mongolia Morocco
Myanmar Republic of Moldova Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sao Tome and Principe South Africa
Sri Lanka Swaziland Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey



































United Nations Medium Variant Projections
















































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Bahrain Bangladesh Belize
Bolivia Cameroon Colombia





































United Nations Medium Variant Projections












































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Papua New Guinea Peru Philippines
Polynesia Qatar Réunion
Samoa Solomon Islands Sudan



































United Nations Medium Variant Projections


























































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Afghanistan Angola Benin
Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi
Cambodia Cape Verde Central African Republic
Chad Comoros Congo
Côte d'Ivoire Dem. Rep. Congo Djibouti


































United Nations Medium Variant Projections


















































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030







































United Nations Medium Variant Projections

































































































1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030
Namibia Nepal Niger
Nigeria Oman Pakistan
Palestinian Territory Paraguay Rwanda
Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia
Tajikistan Tanzania Togo



































United Nations Medium Variant Projections
Category 4: Peak after 2030
 